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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Search and Seizure-Expectations of
Privacy in the Open Fields and an Evolving Fourth Amendment
Standard of Legitimacy: Oliver v. United States
I. INTRODUCTION
In Oliver v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed
the fourth amendment "open fields" doctrine by holding that an expec-
tation of privacy in "open fields" is unreasonable per se. Accordingly,
the Court concluded that the fourth amendment does not protect "open
fields"-land outside the curtilage of a dwelling-against unreasonable
government searches. 2
In the 1924 decision of Hester v. United States,3 the Supreme Court
ruled that the "special protection" of the fourth amendment did not extend
to "the open fields. "4 Hester, however, provided no guidance as to what
kind of land constituted an "open field" for purposes of the fourth amend-
ment's prohibition against unreasonable searches. Four years later, in
Olmstead v. United States,5 the Court held that a fourth amendment search
of a house did not occur unless there was "an actual physical invasion
of [the] house 'or curtilage. "6 After Olmstead, many courts construed
the term "open fields" to mean any land situated beyond the curtilage of
a house.7
The Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States,8 however, cast
1. 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984) [cited as Oliver 1]. This opinion also reports Maine v. Thornton, 104
S. Ct. 1735 (1984) [cited as Thornton i].
2. Id. at 1742. The "open fields" doctrine treats an "open field" as a public place for fourth
amendment purposes. Government officials, therefore, are permitted to search "open fields" without
obtaining a search warrant and without probable cause. Id. at 1738, 1740.
The term "open fields" denotes the area of land outside the curtilage of a home. Id. at 1741,
1742 n. II. The term may describe an area which is neither open, nor a field, nor even land. It may
describe a beach, a desert, or a body of water. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.4(a), at
332 nn.5-13 (1978). "Curtilage" is a general term used to denote the zone of real property surrounding
a home "to which extends the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life."' Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1742 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886)).
3. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
4. Id. at 59. In Hester, Justice Holmes stated that "the special protection accorded by the Fourth
Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open
fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as common law." Id. (citing 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIEs *223, *225, *226). See infra note 86 for an analysis of the common
law distinction.
5. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
6. Id. at 466.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 55-61.
8. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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doubt on the precedential value of these two cases. In Katz, the Court
transformed the method of fourth amendment analysis by announcing a
two-pronged privacy test for ascertaining the amendment's reach.9 Under
the first prong, a court determines whether the individual complaining of
a search possessed a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched.
Under the second prong, the court determines whether this expectation
is one that society deems legitimate. After Katz, the lower courts split
on the question whether an individual's subjective expectation of privacy
in "open fields" had to be tested for legitimacy or whether the Hester-
Olmstead "open fields" doctrine persisted as a blanket exclusion of land
outside the curtilage from the fourth amendment.'"
The decision in Oliver resolved the conflict by reconciling the doctrine's
blanket exclusion of "open fields" from the fourth amendment with the
two-pronged Katz test." Oliver's significance, however, lies in its clar-
ification of Katz's second prong. Oliver states that the correct legal stan-
dard for applying the test's second prong is whether the subjective expectation
of privacy is in a place which is ordinarily the setting for "intimate
activity."' 2 This Note analyzes the Oliver Court's application of the Katz
test to "open fields" and examines Oliver's implication for fourth amend-
ment privacy jurisprudence.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Supreme Court consolidated two cases, United States v. Oliver 3
and State v. Thornton, 4 for review of the continued vitality of the "open
fields" doctrine. '5 In United States v. Oliver, the Kentucky State Police
investigated an anonymous tip that marijuana was cultivated on Ray
Oliver's farm.' 6 The police officers made no attempt to obtain a search
warrant or Oliver's consent to their entry.' 7 After turning off a public
9. Id. at 351-53. The Katz privacy test determines whether a government agent's conduct invaded
a constitutionally protected privacy interest. The test was first articulated as a two-pronged test in
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz. Id. at 361. The Supreme Court quickly adopted Justice
Harlan's formulation as the dispositive fourth amendment analysis. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 9 (1968). See infra text accompanying notes 72-76.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 77-81.
11. Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1742, 1744.
12. Id. at 1741.
13. 686 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc) [cited as Oliver 11].
14. 453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982) [cited as Thornton 11).
15. Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1738.
16. Oliver II, 686 F.2d at 358. The investigating officers were narcotics detectives and previously
had heard rumors that marijuana was cultivated on Oliver's farm. Id. The 200-acre farm was located
20 miles outside the nearest town. Id. at 361 (Keith, J., dissenting). The farm was fenced and posted
against trespassing. Id. at 363.
17. Id. at 362 (Keith, J., dissenting). The United States conceded that the officers did not have
probable cause for a search warrant and that the warrantless entry was not excused by an exception
to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1738 n. 1.
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highway onto Oliver's private gravel road, the officers parked their car
at a locked gate which blocked the road a "short distance" past his home. 8
They continued on foot 9 for over a mile to a secluded field planted with
marijuana.2" Oliver was indicted for "manufactur[ing]" marijuana in vi-
olation of federal statute.2'
The district court suppressed the evidence procured in the warrantless
investigation.22 A panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court's suppression order. 23 The panel held that after Katz,
the "open fields" were no longer "automatically exempted" from the
fourth amendment warrant requirement. 2' The panel applied the Katz
privacy test 25 in holding that the Kentucky State Police officers' war-
rantless investigation violated Oliver's constitutionally protected expec-
tation of privacy in his farm. 26 The court of appeals, sitting en banc,
18. Oliver H, 686 F.2d at 358. The "short distance" beyond Oliver's home apparently was about
3/4 of a mile. Id. at 362 (Keith, J., dissenting). The private road was posted in at least four locations
with "No Trespassing" signs. Id. The police officers disregarded the signs' warning. Id. The locked,
metal gate was posted with a "No Trespassing" sign which the police officers also disregarded. Id.
19. Id. at 358 (Brown, J.). The officers apparently avoided the locked gate by following a path
through a "gap in the fence". Id. at 362 (Keith, J., dissenting). See United States v. Oliver, 657
F.2d 85, 86 (6th Cir. 1981) (Keith, J.) (the officers "slipped through a hole in the gate") [cited as
Oliver II], rev'd en banc, Oliver II, 686 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1982).
The gravel road dwindled as it receded from the highway. Oliver HI, 686 F.2d at 362 (Keith, J.,
dissenting). The road became "markedly narrower" after it passed Oliver's home. Id. The police
officers proceeded down the road for "several hundred yards" past a barn and a parked camper. Id.
Beyond the barn the road had dwindled into an "earthen path". Id. The police officers proceeded
/4 of a mile through "fields and wooded areas". Id. At this point the officers were accosted by
shouts originating from the camper. Id. They were informed that hunting was not allowed and were
ordered to "Come Back Here." Id. The officers returned to the camper but found no one. Id. The
officers then resumed their investigation.
20. The marijuana was planted in a cornfield. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 6, Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. 1735
(1984). The field was located "over a mile" from Oliver's home. Oliver!, 104 S. Ct. at 1738. The
field was "highly secluded," Oliver II, 686 F.2d at 362 (Keith, J., dissenting), and the marijuana
"could not be seen by anyone standing on land other than Oliver's." Id. at 358 (Brown, J.). The
dissent in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc stated, moreover, that the fields could
not be seen from the locked gate, Oliver's home, or the barn. Id. at 362-63. The United States,
however, asserted that the field was visible from the gate but that "it was not possible to determine
from that distance that it was marijuana growing in the field." Brief for the United States at 3 n. 1,
Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
21. Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1738.
22. Oliver 111, 657 F.2d at 88.
23. Id.
24. Id. The panel's characterization of Hester's "open fields" rule as a warrant requirement
exception derives from its overruling of United States v. Hassell, 336 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1964) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 965 (1965), which held that a warrantless search of an "open field"
is not an unreasonable search. See infra note 28.
25. See supra note 9.
26. Oliver II, 657 F.2d at 87. First, the panel found that Oliver's expectation of privacy was
manifested by the locked gate, the "No Trespassing" signs and the private use of the road leading
to his home. Id. Second, the panel found that Oliver's expectation was constitutionally reasonable.
Id. The panel noted that in the absence of exigent circumstances "[s]ociety's interest in law en-
forcement is not unduly hampered by requiring a warrant prior to searching a private field which
Winter 1986]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
overruled the panel and reversed the district court.27 The court of appeals
held that Hester's blanket exclusion of the "open fields" from the pro-
tection of the fourth amendment had not been overruled by Katz.28 The
court reasoned that Hester was "still good Fourth Amendment law" be-
cause any expectation of privacy in the "open fields" is unreasonable as
a matter of law.29 The court, sitting en banc, concluded, therefore, that
"under Hester and Katz," the "open fields" are excluded per se from
the fourth amendment.3"
In State v. Thornton, Maine State Trooper Crandall and another police
officer walked onto Thornton's land without a search warrant or consent
to corroborate an informant's tip that marijuana was cultivated in a wooded
area behind Thornton's house.3 1 They discovered marijuana growing in
two small clearings adjacent to a footpath running through a heavily
wooded portion of Thornton's land.32 After obtaining a search warrant, "
has been reached through a private road exhibiting several 'No Trespassing' signs and blocked by
a locked gate." Id.
27. Oliver 11, 686 F.2d at 358.
28. Id. at 360. The court, in overruling the panel's decision, purported to expressly reaffirm
Hassell. Oliver 11, 686 F.2d at 358. Hassell, however, held that an investigation of an "open field"
was exempted from the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. 336 F.2d at 684. In contrast,
the effect of the Oliver 11 court's holding that a privacy expectation in land outside the curtilage is
unreasonable per se is to exclude the investigation from both the warrant and reasonableness re-
quirements of the fourth amendment. See infra note 46.
29. Oliver II, 686 F.2d at 360. The court expressed two views of an individual's privacy interest
in land outside the curtilage. The first is that "no privacy rights inhere [in] ...an open field of
marijuana." Id. The second view is that no fourth amendment privacy rights inhere in land outside
the curtilage. Id. While the court neglected to distinguish these two conceptions of privacy, the latter
view is the correct expression of the premise of the court's holding that a privacy expectation in
land outside the curtilage is unreasonable for purposes of the fourth amendment.
The property right of exclusive occupation represents society's recognition of a privacy interest
in land. See infra note 106. The question, however, is whether the privacy interest denoted by
property law coincides with the privacy interest protected by the fourth amendment. Judge Brown
answered this question in the negative. First, Judge Brown stated that the fourth amendment shelters
the privacy necessary to "create the conditions and the context for many relationships based on
intimacy, friendship and trust." Oliver 11, 686 F.2d at 360. Second, "[tihe human relations that
create the need for privacy do not ordinarily take place in ...settings [such as the open fields]."
Id. Protection of "open fields" against unreasonable government searches, therefore, is not warranted.
As Judge Brown concluded, "[t]he only significant interest at stake here-a property owner's interest
in excluding others from his possessions-is not sufficient alone to bring into play legal principles
protecting privacy." Id. (footnote omitted).
30. Id.
31. Thornton II, 453 A.2d 489, 491 (Me. 1982) ("without license"). At the time of their first
entry onto the property, the police officers did not know who owned it but assumed that it belonged
to Thornton. Id.
32. Id. The property consisted of approximately 30 acres of secluded, heavily wooded rural land.
Brief for Respondent at 4, Thornton 1, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984). The land was enclosed by an old
stone wall and a barbed wire fence and was posted with "No Trespassing" signs. Thornton 1I, 453
A.2d at 491. The marijuana patches were not visible from any point off Thornton's land. Id. The
patches also were not visible from Thornton's home or his driveway. Id. In oral argument before
the United States Supreme Court, the respondent suggested that aerial surveillance with the unaided
eye also might not disclose the marijuana patches because they were small and the land was thickly
wooded. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 17, 18, Thornton 1, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
33. Probable cause in support of the warrant in part was furnished by Trooper Crandall's obser-
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Trooper Crandall and other police officers returned to Thornton's land
and seized a quantity of marijuana.3" Thornton was indicted for unlawfully
furnishing scheduled drugs.35
The trial court suppressed the evidence procured in the two entries
onto Thornton's land.36 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the
trial court and held that the entries onto Thornton's land constituted
unlawful searches.37 The court held that the Hester "open fields" doctrine38
was inapplicable because Thornton's property was secluded from public
view and because Thornton had taken steps to exclude the public.39 Hence,
Thornton's property was not "open" for purposes of the doctrine. In-
voking Katz, the court unanimously held that the police officers' intrusion
onto Thornton's land defeated Thornton's reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated
the two cases for review.4 The Supreme Court held that Hester's "open
fields" rule retains its vitality and that an expectation of privacy in the
"open fields" is unreasonable per se.a" Accordingly, the Court, with three
vations during the warrantless entry. Thornton II, 453 A.2d at 491. Trooper Crandall did not obtain
a search warrant prior to his initial entry onto Thornton's land because he "didn't feel without
checking it that [he] had enough information." Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 490.
36. Id. at 492. The trial court invalidated the search warrant after holding that the initial warrantless
entry constituted an unlawful search. Id. at 491-92. Accordingly, the trial court granted Thornton's
motion to suppress.
37. Id. at 496.
38. Under the "open fields" doctrine, warrantless searches of land outside the curtilage of a home
are not unconstitutional. See infra text accompanying notes 51-61.
39. Thornton II, 453 A.2d at 495. The court rejected the state's argument that Hester announced
a per se rule excluding "open fields" from the fourth amendment. See id. at 494-95. The court
accepted the defendant's view that the Hester "open fields" doctrine had been modified by the Katz
privacy rationale. See id. at 496. The court stated that application of the "open fields" doctrine
required two predicates: (1) that the activity be visible to the public (2) from a location in which
the public is lawfully present. Id. at 495.
Thornton's expectation of privacy for activity on his land would be subject to the "open fields"
doctrine if he cultivated the marijuana openly and the marijuana was visible to the police officers
from a location in which they had a right to be. Id. Thornton had "made every effort to conceal his
activity". and the officers were required to trespass onto Thornton's land to observe it. Id. at 495.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held, therefore, that the "open fields" doctrine did not apply.
Id. at 495-96.
40. Id. at 495. The court held that Thornton had manifested an expectation of privacy in his land
and that under the circumstances the expectation was reasonable. Id. at 494-95. "He chose a spot
for the marijuana patches that was observable only from his land; he posted No Trespassing and No
Hunting signs on his land; he generally excluded the public from his land." Id. at 494.
41. Oliver v. United States, 459 U.S. 1168 (Jan. 24, 1983), granting cert. to United States v.
Oliver, 686 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1982); Maine v. Thornton, 460 U.S. 1068 (Apr. 4, 1983), granting
cert. to State v. Thornton, 453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982).
42. Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1740, 1742.
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Justices dissenting and one Justice concurring in part, affirmed the Sixth
Circuit sitting en banc in Oliver and reversed Thornton.4"
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The Oliver Court rested its exclusion of "the open fields" from the
fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches on two
grounds. First, the Court affirmed Hester's construction of the plain lan-
guage of the fourth amendment, holding that Hester drew a bright line
excluding land outside the curtilage from the amendment's protection."
Second, the Court reconciled Hester's bright line rule with the legitimate
expectation of privacy test articulated in Katz.45 Following a brief review
of the development of the "open fields" doctrine, this Note analyzes the
Supreme Court's affirmation of the doctrine in Oliver.4
A. The Open Fields Doctrine
1. The Open Fields Doctrine Prior to Katz: Hester v. United States
and Olmstead v. United States
The fourth amendment expressly prohibits unreasonable government
searches of "persons, houses, papers, and effects."47 The amendment's
43. Id. at 1744. Justices Marshall, Brennan and Stevens dissented on the ground that Hester's
blanket exclusion of the "open fields" from the fourth amendment did not survive the privacy test
announced in Katz. Id. at 1745. The dissent argued that depending upon the facts of a case, a person
could possess a constitutionally reasonable expectation of privacy in "open fields." Id. at 1750.
Justice White concurred in the judgment and stated that the reasonableness of an expectation of
privacy in the "open fields" is irrelevant inasmuch as the "open fields" are nowhere mentioned in
the text of the fourth amendment. Id. at 1744. Accordingly, Justice White refused to join the majority's
holding that an expectation of privacy in the "open fields" is unreasonable as a matter of law. Id.
44. Id. at 1740.
45. Id. at 1740-41.
46. Id. at 1741. Oliver's rule excluding "open fields" from the fourth amendment is not an
additional exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. The warrant requirement, see
infra note 47, embodies the principle that generally a judicial officer should decide "[wihen the
right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 14 (1948).
The United States Supreme Court has held on many occasions that a warrantless search is un-
reasonable per se unless the search is excused by a prescribed exception to the warrant requirement.
See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 357; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
However, if an individual's expectation of privacy in the searched premises is not protected by the
fourth amendment then government intrusion into or surveillance of the premises does not constitute
a "search" for purposes of the fourth amendment. United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1660
(1984). In the absence of a constitutionally recognized "search," the fourth amendment's prohibition
of "unreasonable searches" is not implicated by the intrusion or surveillance. Moylan, The Fourth
Amendment Inapplicable Vs. The Fourth Amendment Satisfied: The Neglected Threshold of "So
What?," 1 S. ILL. U.L.J. 75 (1977). The intrusion or surveillance, therefore, need not be reasonable
for purposes of the amendment.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides in pertinent part: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ..... Id. A
warrantless search is invalid per se, unless excused by a recognized exception to the amendment's
warrant requirement. See supra note 46.
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scope, however, is not limited to protection of its express enumerations.
Early in the history of fourth amendment adjudication the Supreme Court
recognized that the amendment's guarantee must not be "gradual[ly]
depreciat[ed]" by "close and literal" interpretation of its terms. 8 In line
with this recognition, the Court has, for instance, extended fourth amend-
ment protection to commercial buildings4 9 and to public telephone booths.5
In 1924, in Hester v. United States,5 l the Supreme Court first confronted
the question whether the fourth amendment protects "open fields." It
turned to common law for guidance in determining whether the protection
against unreasonable government searches accorded to "persons, houses,
papers, and effects" extended to an "open field." '5 2 The common law
extended greater protection against trespass to a dwelling than to the
"open fields" which lay beyond it.53 The Hester Court incorporated this
differential protection into the fourth amendment, holding that the amend-
ment's "special protection" of "houses" does not extend to "the open
fields. ,14
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court in Hester, did not specify what
kind of land constituted "open fields" for purposes of the fourth amend-
ment's prohibition against unreasonable searches. The scope of "open
fields" became more apparent four years later with the Supreme Court's
decision in Olmstead v. United States.5 In Olmstead, the Court held that
a trespass, "or an actual physical intrusion of [a] house 'or curtilage"',
was a necessary predicate to a fourth amendment search of a house.56
Citing to Hester, the Court indicated, however, that the fact of a gov-
ernment trespass on private property did not necessarily constitute a search
for fourth amendment purposes.57 Olmstead's trespass predicate appeared
to equate a house with its curtilage, the zone of land immediately sur-
rounding the house.5 After Olmstead, many courts invoked this equation
of house and curtilage to construe the term "open fields" to include any
land situated beyond the curtilage. 9
Under the Hester-Olmstead "open fields" doctrine, the constitutionality
48. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
49. E.g., G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977).
50. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
51. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
52. Id. at 59.
53. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225-26. See infra note 86 for an analysis of the
common law's protection of a dwelling against trespass.
54. 265 U.S. at 59. See supra note 4.
55. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
56. Id. at 466. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
57. See id. at 465.
58. See id. at 466. The equation also is implied by Hester's distinction between a house and
"the open fields." See infra notes 86-87.
59. See Comment, Katz In Open Fields, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 485, 490-91 (1983). See also
Note, How Open Are Open Fields? United States v. Oliver, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 133, 138 (1982).
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of a search of land turned on whether the land was within the curtilage
of a house and, if so, whether a government agent trespassed onto the
land.' Inasmuch as the "open fields" lay beyond the curtilage, the fourth
amendment did not shelter an "open field" from unreasonable government
searches. Accordingly, the amendment did not prohibit a warrantless
government search of land outside of the curtilage. 6
2. The Open Fields Doctrine in the Aftermath of Katz v. United
States
In a dissent that foreshadowed the future direction of fourth amendment
jurisprudence, Justice Brandeis rejected Olmstead's trespass predicate,
stating that "every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the
privacy of the individual" violated the fourth amendment.62 In 1967, in
Katz v. United States,63 the Supreme Court vindicated Justice Brandeis'
conception of the fourth amendment as harboring a right of privacy.' In
Katz, FBI agents, who declined to obtain a search warrant, eavesdropped
on Katz's telephone conversations, using an electronic listening device
attached to the exterior of the public telephone booth .65 Katz was con-
victed of telephoning wagering information across state lines.
Invoking Olmstead's trespass predicate, the lower courts ruled that no
fourth amendment search had occurred because "' [t]here was no physical
entrance into the area"' occupied by Katz.66 The Supreme Court in Katz
reversed the lower courts and overruled Olmstead's requirement of a
trespass onto a constitutionally protected area.6 7 Noting that the fourth
amendment "protects people, not places," ' 68 the Court reasoned that the
absence of a trespass was without constitutional significance. 69 Since the
warrantless electronic eavesdropping violated "the privacy upon which
60. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53. See also supra note 59.
61. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466; Hester, 265 U.S. at 59.
62. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
63. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
64. Katz inaugurated the modem fourth amendment privacy jurisprudence. See infra text accom-
panying notes 62-76. The Court, however, had recognized as early as 1886 that the fourth amendment
was meant to protect the "privacies of life." Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. See United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 11 n.6 (1977) (purpose of fourth amendment to safeguard "legitimate" privacy interest
"has been settled law in this Court for over 90 years."). And again, well before Katz, the Court
stated in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1948), that "[tihe security of one's privacy against arbitrary
intrusion by the police . . . is at the core of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 27.
65. 389 U.S. at 348.
66. 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966).
67. 389 U.S. at 353.
68. Id. at 351.
69. Id. at 353.
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[Katz] justifiably relied while using the telephone booth," 7 the Court
concluded that the eavesdropping constituted an unreasonable search.
Katz directed courts to determine whether government conduct defeated
legitimate privacy interests. Courts make the determination by applying
a two-pronged expectation of privacy test.7 First, courts inquire into
whether the individual possessed a subjective expectation that his activity
would remain private.72 Second, the courts determine whether the ex-
pectation is objectively reasonable; that is, whether it is one that society
deems legitimate.7 To succeed under Katz, an allegation that a warrantless
search violated the person's expectation of privacy must satisfy both
prongs of the test.74 The first prong requires that the person actually have
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy.75 As a result of the second
prong, however, only those expectations which "society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable'" are entitled to fourth amendment protection.76
Thus, Katz shifts the focus of the inquiry from whether a government
agent physically intruded into an area constitutionally protected per se to
whether the agent invaded an area in which the individual complaining
of the invasion had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.
This shift in focus raised a question as to the continued vitality of the
Hester-Olmstead "open fields" doctrine.77 State and lower federal courts
after Katz developed two conflicting constructions of the scope of Hester's
"open fields" holding. In applying the Katz test to land outside of the
curtilage, some courts concluded that an expectation of privacy in the
land was unreasonable if it was open to the public. These courts construed
Hester narrowly, holding that an "open field" which may be warrantlessly
searched is an area from which the public has not been lawfully excluded
and which is open to public view.7" Other courts applied the Katz test to
70. Id.
71. E.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
72. E.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
73. E.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740
(1979).
74. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 & n.5.
75. In practice, however, the first prong is relatively minor. A showing that the accused exhibited
a subjective expectation of privacy is usually easily made. Moreover, the Supreme Court will waive
the criterion of the first prong altogether in instances where the defendant in fact did not have an
expectation of privacy because he had been "'conditioned' by influences alien to well-recognized
Fourth Amendment freedoms." Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 n.5. In these instances, the relevant test is
whether an "unconditioned" person would have manifested a subjective expectation of privacy. Id.
76. E.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144
n.12 (1978).
77. See Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1739 n.5.
78. See Comment, supra note 59, at 490, 495-96. For a review of the cases narrowly interpreting
Hester, see Oliver 11, 686 F.2d at 368-69 (Keith, J., dissenting) (warrantless searches upheld where
public not excluded) and id. at 369-70 (warrantless searches condemned where public was excluded).
Courts narrowly construing Hester hold that under the two prongs of the Katz test a person who
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conclude that an expectation of privacy in land outside the curtilage is
unreasonable per se. These courts construed Hester broadly, holding that
an "open field" is any land outside the curtilage without regard to the
area's accessibility or visibility to the public.79 The Supreme Court in
Oliver expressly reaffirmed Hester's broad holding." Moreover, the Court
expressed Hester's broad holding in Katz terms by stating that an ex-
pectation of privacy in "open fields" is unreasonable per se.8'
lawfully exercises dominion over land outside the curtilage may manifest a legitimate subjective
expectation of privacy in the land. The first prong is satisfied easily. A person manifests a subjective
expectation by fencing and posting the land against trespassers. E.g., State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d
1093, 1097 (Fla. 1982); Oliver II, 686 F.2d at 371 (Keith, J., dissenting) ("[T]he presence or absence
of fences, gates to impede access, and signs which convey [no trespassing] warnings . . . have
consistently been a determinate of whether the warrantless search was within the Open Fields
Doctrine."). The second prong-whether the expectation is "legitimate"-typically is satisfied when
the land is secluded from public view, is relatively inaccessible to the public and when the person
is entitled to exclude the public from the land. See, e.g., Brady, 406 So. 2d at 1098 ("There can
be no reasonable expectation of privacy in a field open, visible, and easily accessible to others.").
The New Mexico courts adopted the narrow construction of Hester's "open fields" rule. The
decision in State v. Chort, 91 N.M. 584, 577 P.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1978) "illustrates the departure
which Katz requires from the per se rationale of Hester." State v. Bigler, 100 N.M. 515, 516, 673
P.2d 140, 141 (Ct. App. 1983). Chort cultivated marijuana plants in a garden located on his unfenced,
ten acre tract of land. The garden was enclosed by "an almost solid five foot fence." Chort, 91
N.M. at 585, 577 P.2d at 893. The court in Chort noted that the marijuana plants were not visible
"[fqrom any point off the property." Id. at 584-85, 577 P.2d at 892-93. A government agent entered
onto Chort's tract of land and observed the marijuana plants in the garden. In Chort, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals held that the agent's warrantless entry onto Chort's land violated the fourth
amendment. Id. at 585, 577 P.2d at 893.
In so holding, the court noted that Hester did not provide a "talismanic solution" to the question
of the legality of the warrantless entry. It reasoned that the legality of a warrantless search of the
"open fields" "must be viewed in light of the facts of each case subject to the requirements of
Katz." Id. (citation omitted). The court found that Chort manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy by his "placement of the garden" on his land and by fencing the garden. It applied Katz's
second prong without analysis, asserting that "this expectation of privacy was such that society
would recognize as reasonable." Id. The warrantless search of Chort's "open field," therefore, was
unreasonable.
The court of appeals reached the opposite result in State v. Bigler, 100 N.M. 515, 673 P.2d 140
(Ct. App. 1983), cert. quashed, Bigler v. State, 100 N.M. 505, 672 P.2d 1136 (1983). Like Chort,
Bigler involved the out-door cultivation of marijuana. Unlike in Chort, however, the police officer
in Bigler did not trespass upon the defendant's land. Instead, the officer conducted his warrantless
searches by flying over the defendant's land in an airplane and by observing the marijuana from a
county road. Id. at 515, 673 P.2d at 140.
The Bigler court applied the Katz test to the searches of the defendant's land. Id. at 516, 673
P.2d at 141. The court noted that the defendant's land was near a municipal airport and that crop
dusters flew "in the area at will." Id. It reasoned, therefore, that the defendant "had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his field to the extent of visibility from the air." Id. Hence, the Bigler
court concluded that the aerial surveillance of the defendant's "open field" did not violate the fourth
amendment. Id. Compare State v. Rogers, 100 N.M. 517, 673 P.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1983) (helicopter
surveillance of marijuana plants protruding from defendant's greenhouse located "near his house
within the fenced portion of his property."), cert. denied, Rogers v. State, 100 N.M. 439, 671 P.2d
1150 (1983).
79. See Comment, supra note 59, at 490-91.
80. Oliverl, 104 S. Ct. at 1740, 1744.
81. Id. at 1742, 1744.
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B. Oliver's Affirmation of Hester's Plain Language Construction of
the Fourth Amendment
The expressly enumerated subjects of the fourth amendment's ban
against unreasonable government searches are "persons, houses, papers,
and effects." 82 Inasmuch as the "open fields" are not enumerated in the
fourth amendment text, the Oliver Court concluded that the amendment
does not shelter the "open fields" from warrantless government intru-
sion.83 Oliver's plain language construction affirmed the Supreme Court's
construction of "houses" in Hester v. United States84 and Olmstead v.
United States.85 In Hester, the Court held that "the open fields" did not
enjoy the status of the fourth amendment "house" and, therefore, were
not constitutionally protected.86 As a corollary to this proposition, Olin-
stead held that the constitutional status of the fourth amendment "house"
extended to the curtilage, the private land immediately surrounding the
house."
82. See supra note 47.
83. Oliver/, 104 S. Ct. at 1740.
84. 265 U.s. at 57. See infra note 85.
85. 277 U.S. at 438. See infra notes 86-87 for an analysis of Hester and Olmstead's construction
of "houses."
86. In distinguishing a house from "the open fields," the Court in Hester did not explicitly define
an "open field." See Hester, 265 U.S. at 59. Justice Holmes' rationale for the distinctiveness of
"the open fields" draws upon a distinction Blackstone made for purposes of the common law of
burglary of a private house. Blackstone distinguished non-residential buildings associated with a
house "and within the same common fence" from out-lying buildings "distant" from the house. 4
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225.
According to Blackstone, if the former non-residential buildings are "within the curtilage" of a
house then the common law of burglary of a private house extends to these non-residential buildings.
Id. Conversely, since a nocturnal breaking into a "distant" non-residential building is not "attended
with the same circumstances of midnight terror," such a building, presumably outside the curtilage,
is not protected by the common law of burglary of a private house. Id. Hence, the common law
distinction drawn by Blackstone is between a non-residential building inside the curtilage and a non-
residential building outside it. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 96, at 712 (1972).
The distinction in Hester between "the open fields" and a fourth amendment "house" implies an
identity of the curtilage and a fourth amendment "house." This implication comports with Black-
stone's distinction of buildings inside and outside of the curtilage. Blackstone states that "the capital
house protects and privileges all its branches and appurtenance, if within the curtilage." 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225. Consequently, the implication raised by Hester can be understood
as a suggestion that the curtilage is an "appurtenant" or extension of the house and, therefore, enjoys
the house's fourth amendment privileges. Cf. Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1742 ("At common law, the
curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life,' and therefore has been considered part of home itself for Fourth
Amendment purposes.").
87. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. Olmstead held that a fourth amendment search of a house required
"an actual physical invasion of [the] house 'or curtilage."' Id. With this holding, the Olmstead
Court made explicit Hester's implied rule that the curtilage acquires the constitutional status of a
"house" for fourth amendment purposes. With Olmstead, the "open fields" rule of Hester matured
into the doctrine that land outside the curtilage of a dwelling is beyond the protection of the fourth
amendment. See Oliver I!, 686 F.2d at 364 (Keith, J., dissenting).
Winter 19861
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
The dissent in Oliver criticized the majority's "parsimonious" con-
struction of "persons, houses, papers, and effects." 8" The majority in
Oliver, however, avoided the error of "sticking too closely to the words"
of the fourth amendment by justifying its construction of the amendment's
words in terms of the "policy that goes beyond them." 89 Other than
"houses," the only other word in the fourth amendment that could ar-
guably describe land is "effects." The Oliver Court stated that "[t]he
Framers would have understood the term 'effects' to be limited to per-
sonal, rather than real, property. "' The Court noted that the initial draft
of the fourth amendment contained the more inclusive "property," which
was subsequently replaced by the less inclusive "effects." 9 The Oliver
majority concluded from this legislative history that the framers did not
intend the fourth amendment to shelter "open fields" from warrantless
government intrusion.92 Moreover, the Court rationalized the framers'
intent in terms consistent with the fourth amendment guarantee of privacy.
The Oliver Court interpreted the framers' intent as reflecting a societal
understanding that expectations of privacy in land outside the curtilage
were unreasonable.93 Whether the majority's textual construction was
parsimonious or not, its rationalization of the framers' intent in terms of
reasonable expectations of privacy demonstrated fidelity to the amend-
ment's language without distorting Katz.
While the Couit in Oliver narrowly construed the fourth amendment,
it did not depreciate the amendment's guarantee of individual privacy.
Oliver's reliance on textual construction on one hand serves as a reminder
that the fourth amendment's plain language erects a barrier beyond which
claims of privacy in certain areas cannot reach.94 This reminder is es-
pecially applicable to those areas like "open fields" which existed con-
88. Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1745.
89. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
90. Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1740 n. 7 (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 1740.
92. Id.
93. See Oliver1, 104 S. Ct. at 1741-42.
94. Id. at 1740 n.6 (Katz did not "sever Fourth Amendment doctrine from the Amendment's
language."). The dissent in Oliver suggested that the plain language construction ground is a mere
adjunct to the Court's analysis of privacy interests in the "open fields." Id. at 1746 n.7. The dissent
argued that the Court intended its Katz analysis to buttress "the weakness of its [plain language
construction] argument." Id. Moreover, the dissent expresses the view that the Court's Katz analysis,
and not its plain language construction, is controlling. Hence, the plain language construction ground
"will have little or no effect on our future decisions in this area." Id. The dissent's argument,
however, misinterpreted Oliver's attempt to link the scope of Katz functional privacy analysis to the
textual boundary of the fourth amendment. The Katz privacy analysis is directed towards the inquiry
into whether the challenged government intrusion thwarts the function of the fourth amendment.
Oliver refines the scope of the analysis by distilling this function from the history and text of the
fourth amendment.
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temporaneously with the framers of the fourth amendment. The Court's
construction of "houses" suggests that the framers recognized the ne-
cessity of protecting the curtilage against government interference if the
house was to be protected. Its construction of "effects" suggests that if
the framers had intended to protect "open fields" they would not have
substituted a word describing only personal property for a word that
described personal and real property. In both instances, Oliver justifies
the framers' intent by attributing it to their contemporaneous understand-
ing that a landowner or tenant could not legitimately expect his "open
fields" to be free of warrantless government intrusion.95
Yet, on the other hand, this justification is not available where the
framers' intent cannot be inferred from the fourth amendment's plain
language. The Oliver Court's method of textual construction does not
carry over to novel areas, such as phone booths or automobiles, that did
not exist when the amendment was drafted. Oliver's plain language con-
struction, therefore, does not impair the framework for resolving search
and seizure issues and fact patterns that could not have been envisioned
by the fourth amendment framers and are not accommodated by that
amendment's text.96 Hence, the Court's plain language construction in
Oliver does not appear to limit future opportunities to extend fourth
amendment protection to novel areas.97
C. Oliver's Reconciliation of Hester's Blanket Exclusion with Katz's
Expectation of Privacy Test
As the second ground for its decision, the Oliver Court reconciled
Hester's broad holding98 with the two-pronged expectation of privacy test
articulated in Katz v. United States and its progeny. 99 Oliver's significance
lies in this reconciliation of Hester with Katz.
The defendants in the courts below argued that their expectations of
95. Id. at 1740, 1742. See infra text accompanying notes 125-32.
96. See Oliver I1, 686 F.2d at 359 (suggesting that the Katz test is designed to govern the
"application of the Fourth Amendment under circumstances that could not have been contemplated
at the time the Amendment was formulated and adopted"). See also Comment, supra note 59, at
497-98.
97. See Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1740 n.6 ("As Katz demonstrates, the Court fairly may respect
the constraints of the Constitution's language without wedding itself to a [sic] unreasoning literal-
ism."). The Oliver Court's acknowledgement that relying exclusively on the explicit text of the
fourth amendment is not an adequate methodology for construing the fourth amendment is directed
towards Justice White. Justice White joined the majority's plain language construction ground but
refused to join the majority's privacy analysis. "However reasonable a landowner's expectations of
privacy may be, those expectations cannot convert a field into a 'house' or an 'effect.'" Id. at 1744
(White, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
98. See supra text accompanying note 79.
99. Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1740, 1742.
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privacy were legitimate because their land was secluded and the expec-
tations were created by their common law property right to exclude the
public from the land.'"° The Oliver Court rejected the defendants' argu-
ments, holding (1) that the right to exclude did not legitimate the de-
fendants' expectations of privacy in their "open fields" and (2) that the
appropriate legal standard for evaluating the legitimacy of the defendants'
privacy expectations was the utility of the "open fields" as a setting for
activity which merits fourth amendment protection. "' These two holdings
indicate that the trespass law source of a privacy expectation does not
automatically confer constitutional status on the expectation. Thus, under
Katz's second prong the constitutional status of a privacy expectation is
determined by reference to the purpose of the fourth amendment, not by
reference to an independent source such as the law of private property.
Examination of each of these two holdings suggests that Oliver's appli-
cation of Katz's second prong is correct.
1. The Right To Exclude Does Not Evidence a Legitimate
Expectation of Privacy
The Supreme Court in Oliver v. United States applied the two prongs
of the Katz test to determine whether a subjective expectation of privacy
in the "open fields" is one that "society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' ""02 The Court accepted the findings below that the defend-
ants had each satisfied the first prong of the Katz test by manifesting a
subjective expectation of privacy in their land.'° 3 The courts in State v.
Thornton and United States v. Oliver, however, formulated conflicting
legal standards of legitimacy governing the analysis under Katz's second
prong."04 Accordingly, the lower courts in Thornton and Oliver squarely
presented the United States Supreme Court with the question of the "ap-
propriate legal standard"'0 5 for evaluating the objective reasonableness,
or legitimacy, of an expectation of privacy in the "open fields."
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court in Thornton held that the legitimacy
of Thornton's expectation was evidenced by his authority to rely on the
common law of trespass and his concomitant common law right to exclude
the public from his secluded land.'06 Conversely, the Sixth Circuit Court
100. See id. at 1742-43.
101. Id. at 1741, 1743-44.
102. Id. at 1740 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
103. See id. at 1742-43.
104. See infra text accompanying notes 106-14.
105. Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1739 n.5.
106. Thornton II, 453 A.2d at 495. For courts narrowly construing Hester, the legitimacy of an
expectation of privacy in land outside the curtilage is reflected in the land owner or tenant's right
to exclude the public from the private land. The land owner or tenant's right to exclude the public
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of Appeals in Oliver held that the common law of trespass and the right
to exclude did not evidence a societal understanding that land outside the
curtilage should be free of warrantless government intrusion."0 7 Accord-
ingly, the court ruled that Oliver's authority to rely on the common law
of trespass failed to validate his subjective expectation of privacy., o
The supreme judicial court in Thornton understood that lawful public
access to "open" land precluded a legitimate expectation of privacy."
The unanimous court reasoned, however,' that a person could manifest a
constitutionally protected expectation of privacy by taking steps to exclude
the public." 0 The court based its reasoning on Katz, in which the Supreme
Court had stated that that which a person "seeks to preserve as private,
from private property is a "fundamental element" of modem property rights. Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979). This right embodies an expectation of freedom from unlicensed
intrusions onto private land. See, e.g., Thornton 11, 453 A.2d at 494. See also Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978).
As the Supreme Court recognized in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971), legal
prescriptions translate "into rules the customs and values of the past and present." The law of trespass
represents society's mandate that a person may enjoy a right of exclusive occupation of real property.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 165 (1965). This right of exclusive occupation confers a cor-
relative right enforceable by trespass law, the right to exclude others. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2
comment, at 85, 87 (1980) (Criminal trespass involves "defiance of the owner's request or notice
to desist from trespass."). Accordingly, the expectation of privacy implicit in the right is sanctioned
by society inasmuch as the right to exclude is enforced by the common and statutory law of trespass.
Members of the Supreme Court have suggested that the right to exclude the public from private
property may indicate society's legitimation of an expectation of privacy in property. Justice Black-
mun has stated that "[i]n my view, that 'right to exclude' often may be a principal determinant in
the establishment of a legitimate fourth amendment interest." Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,
112 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring). See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338,
354 (1977) (Blackmun, J.) ("It is one thing to seize without a warrant property resting in an open
area ... and it is quite another thing to effect a warrantless seizure of property . . . situated on
private premises to which access is not otherwise available for the seizing officer.").
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), suggested
that "[o]ne of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others and one who owns
or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of
privacy by virtue of this right to exclude." Id. at 144 n. 12 (citation omitted). In Rakas, petitioners
asserted that a warrantless search of the glove compartment and the area below the seat of the car
in which they were riding was unconstitutional. The Court rejected this claim in part because the
petitioners failed to show that they "had complete dominion and control over [the areas searched],
and could exclude others from [them]." Id. at 149. Significantly, the Rakas Court distinguished the
result in Katz, in which the warrantless surveillance of a public telephone booth was held uncon-
stitutional, on the ground that the accused in Katz had exercised his right to exclude the public. Id.
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (where the Court disposed of the government's argument that this right
to exclude could not indicate a legitimate expectation of privacy because the telephone booth was
partly transparent: "But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding
eye-it was the uninvited ear.").
107. Oliver 11, 686 F.2d at 360 ("[A] property owner's interest in excluding others . . . is not
sufficient alone to bring into play legal principles protecting privacy.").
108. See id.
109. Thornton 11, 453 A.2d at 495.
110. See id. at 495-96.
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even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected.''. The law of trespass provides the means with which a person
vindicates his right to be free of intruders onto his private land." 2 The
state court in Thornton, therefore, reasoned that the societal legitimation
required by Katz's second prong is reflected in a person's authority to
rely on trespass law to preserve the privacy of his land." 3 In light of
Thornton's attempts to exclude the public by posting his land against
trespassers, the state court concluded that Thornton's expectation of pri-
vacy was legitimate." 4 Thus, the lower court's analysis under the second
prong of the Katz test was guided by the proposition that the law of
trespass may legitimate an expectation of privacy for fourth amendment
purposes.
The United States Supreme Court in Oliver squarely rejected the Thorn-
ton court's reasoning. "' Oliver's rejection of trespass law as evidence of
the legitimacy mandated by the second prong of the Katz test rested on
two grounds. First, the Oliver Court reasoned that the law of trespass
does not evidence a legitimate expectation of privacy because it only
incidentally promotes a person's interest in the privacy of land outside
the curtilage."' Second, and more significantly, Oliver held that the pri-
vacy interest incidentally promoted by trespass law is itself not the kind
of privacy interest the fourth amendment is designed to protect. '
Oliver's first ground for rejecting the trespass law standard of legiti-
macy distinguished the common law right to exclude from the constitu-
tional right to be free of unreasonable government searches. The Supreme
Court in Oliver noted that the law of trespass confers the property right
of a person to exclude others from his land."' It also noted, however,
111. 389 U.S. at 351-52. See also id. at 359 ("Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know
that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.").
112. See supra note 106.
113. See Thornton 11, 453 A.2d at 495.
114. Id.
115. Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1743-44.
116. Id. at 1744. The Court expressly reasoned that the law of trespass does not evidence a
societal legitimation of privacy in the "open fields" because it principally promotes "a range of
interests that have nothing to do with privacy." Id. at 1744 n. 15. The Court did not dispute that
"the right to exclude conferred by trespass law embodies a privacy interest." Id. Nevertheless,
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Oliver, argued that the majority "surely must concede that one of
the purposes of the law of real property . . . is to define and enforce privacy interests." Id. at 1747
n. 10 (emphasis in original). This statement implies, incorrectly, that the majority rejected the view
that the common law of trespass promotes a privacy interest in real property. The Court did not
dispute the notion that the law of trespass may define and enforce a privacy interest. See id. at 1744
n. 15. Rather, the Court held in Oliver that the privacy interest promoted by the law of trespass is
too attenuated to warrant the use of trespass law as evidence of a societal legitimation of a privacy
interest. Id. at 1744.
117. See id. at 1741-42.
118. Id. at 1744 n.15.
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that trespass law principally promotes "a range of interests that have
nothing to do with privacy. ""'9 Hence, the Court reasoned that vindication
of the right to exclude by the law of trespass only incidentally promotes
an interest in privacy in the "open fields. "20 The Oliver Court concluded,
therefore, that trespass law and the right to exclude are "insufficiently
linked"' 2 to the promotion of privacy in the "open fields" to justify their
use as presumptive evidence of a legitimate expectation of privacy. 122
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1744 & n.15. See supra note 116.
121. Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1739. While the law of private property may create an interest in
privacy, in Oliver, the constitutional status of the interest is governed by the function of the fourth
amendment. This mode of reasoning is analogous to a method by which the Court has decided
whether "'entitlement' interests created by statutory law" constitute "property" for purposes of the
fourteenth amendment due process clause. Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL
L. REv. 405, 407 (1977). A person's interest in a thing which the government has taken away may
rise to the level of a property interest if the person has a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to it.
See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). As the Court noted in Roth, the fourteenth
amendment does not create the property interest. 408 U.S. at 577. Rather, it is created and defined
by an "independent source such as state law." id. The legitimacy, or the constitutional significance
of the interest, however, is a function of fourteenth amendment standards. Monaghan, supra, at
437.
While Oliver distinguishes the origin of a privacy interest (the right to exclude) from its consti-
tutional significance, it goes further by articulating the standard for measuring the legitimacy of the
interest. See infra text accompanying notes 133-46. Moreover, unlike the fourteenth amendment
property interest, the fourth amendment privacy interest does not have an independent source outside
of the fourth amendment. Id.
122. Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1743-44. In Olmstead, the Supreme Court held that a physical trespass
on a house or its curtilage is a necessary predicate to a fourth amendment search of a house. 277
U.S. at 466. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. The predominance of property law in fourth
amendment jurisprudence began to diminish as early as 1960, in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960). Cf. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 460 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting
that the "grudging, narrow conception of 'search and seizures' expressed in Olmstead has not been
followed by the Court as indicated by the cases in which "the Court has refused to crowd the fourth
amendment into the mold of local property law.") (citations omitted).
In 1967, Katz overruled Olmstead's trespass predicate. 389 U.S. at 353. See supra text accom-
panying note 67-70. Katz, however, did not altogether forbid reliance on property law to define a
protected area. Katz did not identify the sources of the societal understanding that an expectation
of privacy in an area is or is not reasonable. After Katz, many lower courts viewed property law as
a source of guidance for deciding which expectations of privacy society is prepared to sanction. See
supra notes 78, 106 and accompanying text. Hence, after Katz, many courts continued relying on
property law to define a protected area. These courts construed the common law of trespass and the
right to exclude the public from private land as indicative of the reasonableness of an expectation
of privacy in the "open fields." Id. Thus, these lower courts often decided the constitutional status
of an expectation of privacy in the "open fields" by reference to the law of trespass. Id.
The Oliver Court did not contest the general rule that property rights and the common law may
be material to an analysis of legitimate expectations of privacy. Indeed, the Court recognized that
"(t]he common law may guide consideration of what areas are protected by the fourth amendment
search by defining areas whose invasion by others is wrongful." 104 S. Ct. at 1744 (citation omitted).
The Court noted that Hester's use of the common law concept of "curtilage" illustrates this function.
Id. at 1744 n. 14. The Court's analysis, however, makes clear that conduct deemed wrong at common
law is not synonymous with conduct deemed wrong by the fourth amendment. See id. at 1743-44.
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2. Oliver's Intimate Activities Standard For Evaluating the
Legitimacy of an Expectation of Privacy
The Oliver Court was not content to rest its rejection of the trespass
law standard of legitimacy on the conclusion that the linkage of trespass
law and the right to exclude to privacy in the "open fields" is too atten-
uated to evidence society's legitimation of an expectation of privacy in
land outside the curtilage. It stated that even if the right to exclude
embodies a privacy interest, "it does not follow that . . . [the privacy
interest] is also protected by the fourth amendment. "1 23 Hence, as a second
ground for rejecting the trespass law standard, the Court distinguished
the privacy interest embodied in a person's right to exclude others from
his land from the interest in privacy that the fourth amendment is designed
to protect. The Oliver Court concluded that even if a warrantless gov-
ernment intrusion into the defendants' "open fields" violated a privacy
interest embodied in the defendants' right to exclude, the intrusion did
not violate an interest in privacy protected by the fourth amendment. 24
The Court's distinction between a privacy interest embodied in the
right to exclude others from private land and a fourth amendment privacy
interest rests on its analysis of the utility of an "open field" as a setting
for personal and social activity. Rather than the existence of entitlements
created by trespass law, the Oliver Court stated that the test of legitimacy
under Katz's second prong is whether the government's intrusion into an
"open field" "infringes upon the personal and societal values protected
by the Fourth Amendment. ", 25 The Court identified three traditional fac-
tors relevant to determining whether a government intrusion infringes
upon the "personal and societal values" of the fourth amendment. It
identified these factors as (1) the framers' intent, (2) "the uses to which
the individual has put a location," and (3) the "societal understanding
that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection."' 26 The Court
in Oliver considered these three factors in its analysis of the "open fields,"
concluding the "open fields" did not merit fourth amendment protection.
The Oliver Court explained that the framers intended the fourth amend-
ment to immunize "certain enclaves" against "arbitrary government in-
terference.' 27 In holding that an "open field" is not such an enclave,
the Court reasoned that "open fields do not provide the setting for those
intimate activities" that the framers intended the fourth amendment to
123. Oliver!, 104 S. Ct. at 1744 n.15.
124. See id. at 1743.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1741. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)
(reviewing the use of these three factors in fourth amendment analysis).
127. Oliver1, 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
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protect." 8 Instead, the Court found that "open fields" ordinarily are the
setting for activities, like crop cultivation, which the framers did not
intend, and society does not expect, to be free from warrantless govern-
ment searches.' 29 The Oliver Court reconciled Hester's blanket exclusion
with the Katz test by concluding that neither the framers' intent, the uses
to which "open fields" are ordinarily put, nor societal expectations le-
gitimate an expectation of privacy in "open fields." 30
In contrast to the "open fields," Oliver includes the curtilage within
the protection of the fourth amendment. By definition the curtilage is a
discrete area in which "the intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity
of a man's home and the privacies of life'" occurs. 3' Based on the
personal and social uses to which the curtilage is ordinarily put, the Court
in Oliver concluded that an expectation of privacy in the curtilage is one
that "society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."" 32
IV. IMPLICATIONS
A close examination of the Oliver Court's method of evaluating the
legitimacy of an expectation of privacy in the curtilage and "open fields"
suggests an evolution in privacy analysis under Katz's second prong. Katz
inaugurated modern fourth amendment jurisprudence when it created the
two-pronged expectation of privacy test. Katz's emphasis on a person's
expectation of privacy, however, did not render obsolete an inquiry into
the nature of the area to which the expectation attaches. Justice Harlan,
who first articulated the Katz privacy analysis as a two-pronged test,
observed that while the fourth amendment protects "people, not places,"
the question of "what protection it affords to those people . . .[g]enerally
...requires reference to a 'place."" 33 Inasmuch as personal and social
activity must occur within some "place," the place must be protected
from government intrusion if the privacy of the activity is to be pre-
served. " Under the second prong of the Katz test, the recognition that
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1742.
131. Id. (quoing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
132. Id.
133. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
134. Indeed, this result inevitably follows from the finding that a warrantless search of the place
violated constitutionally protected expectations of privacy. The privileged status of an area creates
a "zone of privacy" into which the government may not unreasonably intrude. J. HALL, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 2:7, at 43 (1982). As early as 1928, members of the Court recognized that the fourth
amendment cast a penumbra within which a person is protected against arbitrary government inter-
ference. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Griswold
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an expectation of privacy in activity occurring within a place is "rea-
sonable" reflects a societal understanding that the place should be free
of arbitrary government interference.
The Katz Court cautioned, however, that the fourth amendment's re-
straints on government conduct shield only certain privacy expectations
from arbitrary government interference. '35 This limitation is incorporated
by Katz's second prong, which provides that only objectively reasonable,
or legitimate, expectations are protected. Echoing Justice Harlan's ob-
servation, Oliver reasserts that recognition of legitimate expectations often
requires reference to a "place. "'36 Oliver, however, builds on the analysis
by articulating a standard of legitimacy under the second prong. In Oliver,
the discrete area to which the fourth amendment right of privacy inheres
is viewed as an "enclave" to which people retreat, and in which people
reasonably expect, to be free of "arbitrary government interference. 137
An "enclave" acquires its constitutional dimensions because it is ordi-
narily the setting for "intimate activities" whose protection realizes the
"personal and societal values" embedded in the fourth amendment.' 3
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (listing the fourth amendment as one of several creating
penumbras, or zones of privacy).
The Court's recognition of a zone of privacy protecting that which occurs within it against arbitrary
government interference has not been limited to the fourth amendment prohibition against unrea-
sonable searches. In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n. 13 (1973), a case involving
the fourteenth amendment right of privacy, the Court stated that the place in which personal intimacies
occur is protected "as otherwise required to safeguard the right to intimacy involved." But perhaps
the most dramatic application of the concept of a zone of privacy protecting the activity occurring
within "places" has occurred in the fourth amendment context. For instance, as Justice Harlan once
stated, "if the physical curtilage of the home is protected, it is surely as a result of solicitude toprotect the privacies of the life within." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
The Court in Oliver explicitly recognized the necessity of protecting an area in which the "privacies
of life" occur. 104 S. Ct. at 1741 ("The [Fourth] Amendment reflects the recognition of the Founders
that certain enclaves should be free from arbitrary government interference."). Moreover, the utility
of an area as a setting for "the privacies of life" is pivotal in Oliver's analysis of the "open fields."
See supra text accompanying notes 125-32.
135. In framing the applicability of the fourth amendment in terms of individual privacy, the
Court in Katz emphasized that the amendment did not create a "general constitutional 'right toprivacy.'" 389 U.S. at 350. A person's "general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by otherpeople" is governed "largely" by state law. Id. at 350-51 (emphasis in original). The fourth amend-
ment, on the other hand, creates a limited right of privacy. Id. at 350. The amendment protects aperson's privacy against "certain kinds of government intrusion." Id. This right of privacy has been
characterized as a right to control the disclosure of information "by which the w6rld defines one'sidentity." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTUTIONAL LAW § 15-17, at 966 (1978). The fourth amendment,
however, "confers protection [of such a right] only within a fairly restricted sphere of places and
situations." Id. at 967. In dictum, Justice Stevens has stated that the fourth amendment "directly"
protects a person's right "to be free in his private affairs from governmental surveillance." Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977).
136. See Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1741-42.
137. Id. at 1741.
138. Id. The Oliver opinion does not use the adverb "ordinarily" to qualify its conclusion that
the "open fields" do not provide a setting for "intimate activities." The qualification may be inferred,
however, from the Court's statement that "in most instances" a government intrusion into the "open
fields" will not disturb such activity. See id. at 1741 n. 10.
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The Oliver Court's conception of an "enclave" as a discrete area to
which an individual retreats to escape government surveillance is con-
sonant with the traditional view that the fourth amendment creates a zone
of personal privacy.'39 The Court's further characterization of an "en-
clave" as the situs of "intimate activities," however, particularizes the
fourth amendment's limited right of privacy. Under Oliver, whether an
area is enveloped within the zone of personal privacy created by the
fourth amendment depends upon the uses to which the area is put.' 4
Oliver emphasizes that the fourth amendment zone of privacy does not
envelope any area that a person may desire to be private.' 4 ' Instead,
Oliver's distinction between curtilage and the "open fields" suggests that
the kinds of uses to which an area is normally put will be determinative
in deciding whether the area warrants fourth amendment protection. 42 In
this regard, the Court in Oliver appears to limit the fourth amendment
zone of privacy to areas in which activity associated with the domestic
intimacy of the home, or to areas where analogous intimacy, ordinarily
occurs.' 43 Thus, Oliver's definition of "enclave" suggests that an expec-
tation of privacy in an area and, hence, the protectability of the area turns
on the utility of the area as a setting for "intimate activities."
The activity which Oliver labels as "intimate" is activity whose pro-
tection from arbitrary government interference realizes the "personal and
societal values" embedded in the fourth amendment. "4 The Oliver Court
did not elaborate on the kinds of activity which are sufficiently "intimate,"
nor did the Court allude to the meaning of "intimacy" for purposes of
the fourth amendment right of privacy. Moreover, Oliver does not provide
a road map of the values implicit in the fourth amendment. The Sixth
Circuit, sitting en banc in United States v. Oliver, stated only that the
fourth amendment "establish[es] an environment in which individual
emotional and mental processes can develop freely. "'45 While Oliver does
not resolve these perplexing issues, it nevertheless clarifies the proper
analysis of the legitimacy of an expectation of privacy by asking whether
the searched area ordinarily is used in such a manner as to create a zone
of privacy in which, perhaps, "individual emotional and mental pro-
cesses" are entitled to develop freely.
139. See supra note 134.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 128-32.
141. See Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1743 ("The test of legitimacy is not whether the individual
chooses to conceal assertedly 'private' activity. Rather, the correct inquiry is whether the government's
intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment. ").
142. See id. at 1741 ("There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities,
such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields."). See also id. at 1742 n. 10 (Open fields
"are unlikely to provide the setting for activities whose privacy is sought to be protected by the
Fourth Amendment.").
143. See id. at 1741-42.
144. Id. at 1743.
145. Oliver 11, 686 F.2d at 360. See supra note 29.
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Oliver's "intimate activities" standard is not limited to "open fields"
fact patterns. The Court's category of "intimate activities" provides the
basis for making normative value judgments as to what kinds of places
should be protected by the fourth amendment. By expanding or restricting
the definition of "intimate activities," the Court can expand or shrink the
range of places protected by the fourth amendment."6 Although Oliver's
"intimate activity" standard of legitimacy is not without ambiguity, it
nevertheless expresses accurately the fundamental inquiry required by
Katz. The object of the inquiry propounded by Katz is to discern whether
an expectation of privacy is one that society deems legitimate for purposes
of the fourth amendment. Oliver recognizes that the fourth amendment's
zone of privacy demarcates an enclave within which individuals are en-
titled to be free of arbitrary government interference. Moreover, the de-
cision recognizes that the enclave status of an area is a function of its
normative utility as a setting for "intimate activities." The search for the
indicia of "intimate activities," which Oliver invites, is, thus, a more
coherent approach to solving fourth amendment privacy issues than pri-
mary reliance on property rights and the common law.
V. CONCLUSION
By reaffirming Hester, Oliver resolved the long-standing uncertainty
as to the continued vitality of the "open fields" doctrine as a bright line
rule. By rejecting trespass law as a basis for a fourth amendment right
of privacy in the "open fields," Oliver subjects owners or tenants of land
outside the curtilage to an increased risk of government trespasses and
warrantless searches.'47 In "open fields" cases, the question presented
will be whether the area searched without a warrant was within or without
the curtilage. 4 '
Oliver's focus on the status of a place as a setting for "intimate activ-
ities" refines the analytical approach to Katz's second prong. After Katz,
146. For instance, the Court could limit "intimate activities" to the personal intimacies of home,
family, marriage, and child-rearing. Conversely, the Court could define "intimate activities" as
expansively as the scope of fourth amendment protections suggested by Justice Brandeis in his
Olmstead dissent. Justice Brandeis argued that the "right to be let alone" is "the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478. He concluded
that "[t]o protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the
individual . . . must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
147. See Oliver 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1741. An aggrieved defendant, however, may bring a trespass
action against the intruder. See id. at 1748 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criminal trespass liability).
148. Thus, in Wellford v. Comm., 315 S.E. 2d 235 (Va. 1984), decided ten days after the Supreme
Court's decision in Oliver, the court stated that "the sole question is whether the contraband was
located within the curtilage of a dwelling or within an open field when subjected to a warrantless
search and seizure." Id. at 235.
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many courts viewed an expectation of privacy in the "open fields" as
presumptively legitimate if the expectation rested on an entitlement such
as a property owner's right to be free of trespassers. In an Oliver-type
analysis, however, the legitimacy of an expectation of privacy in a place
is a function of the utility of the place as a setting for those activities
whose protection realizes the "personal and social values" of the fourth
amendment. Oliver's standard of legitimacy under the second prong of
the Katz test provides a mode of reasoning for assessing the legitimacy
of an expectation of privacy in terms specific to the constitutional right
of privacy contained in the fourth amendment. Oliver thus refines the
Katz analysis by uncoupling the fourth amendment right of privacy from
the right of privacy deriving from property law.
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